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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Grant Gilmore proclaimed that contract law was dead,
transformed into a branch of the burgeonin body of tort law.'
The validity of this claim is open to debate, but it is generally
t Attorney with Halleland, Lewis, Nilan, Sipkins & Johnson, P.A., Minnea-
polis, Minnesota. The author wishes to thank other members of the firm for their
excellent prior research and analysis of this subject. In addition, special recogni-
tion is due to Jessica Shaw, who mentored with the author while this article was
written and who provided valuable assistance.
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
2. "Reviewers found much of Gilmore's account inaccurate, incomplete, ex-
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agreed that tort theories of recovery have become more prominent
in areas once dominated by the rules of contract.3 Product liability
is no exception. The previous century witnessed a virtual aban-
donment of warranty-a contract theory-in favor of strict liability
for defective products, a new tort theory.4
The ascendance of tort law in product liability cases has under-
standable appeal in the context of bodily injury suffered by a con-
sumer. Tort law is a flexible remedy, responsive to the specific facts
of a case, the quality of the parties' conduct, and the extent to
which an injury has affected the plaintiffs very personal circum-
stances. Tort doctrines arguably have less appeal, however, in the
commercial context. Predictability and a common understanding
of the "ground rules" for business transactions are important policy
concerns typically undermined by the flexibility that gives tort law
its vigor.
Standing guard at the crossroads of tort and contract is the
economic loss doctrine. Late in the last century, Minnesota moved
to forestall the "death of contract" in commercial settings when first
the state courts, and then the state legislature, adopted this doc-
trine. Recent years have seen that doctrine clarified. However,
several issues surrounding recovery for economic loss are not been
resolved. Careful attention to the foundational principles of the
economic loss doctrine should allow Minnesota courts in the next
century to prevent commercial law from "drown[ing] in a sea of
tort. '
aggerated or unoriginal." Robert A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore's "The Death of
Contract", 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 32, 32 (1995) (citing James R. Gordley, The Death of
Contract, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452 (1975) (book review); Robert W. Gordon, The Death
of Contract, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1216 (1974) (book review); MortonJ. Horwitz, The
Death of Contract, 42 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 787 (1975) (book review); Ralph J. Mooney,
The Rise and Fall of Classical Contract Law: A Response to Professor Gilmore, 55 OR. L.
REv. 155 (1976); Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1975); Richard Danzig, The Death of Con-
tract and the Life of the Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia,
29 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1977); AnthonyJ. Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 42 MD. L. REV.
865 (1983)).
3. Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall," 79
B.U.L. REv. 263, 265-66 (1999); Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary:
An Economic Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic
Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 877, 877-78 (1992).
4. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); William
L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791 (1966).
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In this article, I will discuss the relatively brief history, and a
blueprint for the future, of the economic loss doctrine in Minne-
sota. Initially, I will examine the origin of the doctrine and the pol-
icy concepts upon which it is founded. Second, I will look at how
the doctrine has developed in Minnesota since its recognition in
1981. Finally, I will discuss three illustrative examples of out-
standing issues regarding economic loss and how Minnesota courts
should address them in coming years.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
The economic loss doctrine can trace its ultimate origins to
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The Code was promul-
gated in 1951, adopted with minor revisions by Pennsylvania in
1953, and adopted6 by all the remaining states but one over the en-
suing fifteen years. The overriding purpose of the U.C.C. was the
creation of a single, uniform body of law to govern commercial
transactions throughout the United States. This purpose is evident
from both the terms of the Code and commentary upon it.7
The economic loss doctrine first emerged in recognizable
form in 1965 when the California Supreme Court decided Seely v.
White Motor Company." In that case, the plaintiff purchased a truck
that "galloped," or bounced violently. For nearly one year after the
purchase, the dealer repeatedly attempted to fix the problem, and
sought advice from the manufacturer's representatives. None of
these attempts succeeded. On one occasion, while slowing down to
make a turn, the plaintiff found the truck's brakes did not work,
and the truck overturned.9 The plaintiff was not hurt, but the truck
was severely damaged. °
Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, affirmed the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of breach of
express warranty. However, he rejected the alternative strict liabil-
ity claims, because that doctrine was intended only to govern cases
involving physical injuries. Chief Justice Traynor explained that
this was a logical extension of existing tort law:
6. Richard E. Speidel, et al., COMMERCIAL LAW TEACHING MATERIALS 6 (4th
ed. 1987).
7. Infra Part I.A.
8. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
9. Id. at 147.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 148.
2000]
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A consumer should not be charged at the will of the
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however,
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not
match his economic expectations unless the manufac-
turer agrees that it will. Even in actions for negligence, a
manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical
injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss
alone. 2
Seely has been widely followed, and may be considered to have set
the stage for widespread recognition of the economic loss doc-
trine.
The origins and subsequent development of the economic loss
doctrine reveal several fundamental reasons for its existence.
A. Uniformity Of Commercial Law
The principal policy basis for the doctrine is maintaining a
uniform and predictable body of commercial law. The Uniform
Commercial Code was an attempt to organize a coherent frame-
work for the law of commercial transactions. The Code was a re-
sponse to the problem described so eloquently near the turn of the
twentieth century:
I am told that an American lawyer who wishes to keep
abreast of the current of judicial decision has to take in
some fifty-eight volumes of Law Reports each year. In
America, there is no choice between common law on the
one hand and statute law on the other. Each state is in-
dependent in matters of legislation and judicature. The
American lawyer, therefore, has to deal not with one but
with forty streams of common law, each of which is liable
to be disturbed by the action of an independent Legisla-
ture. But Commerce knows nothing of State boundaries,
and it seems intolerable that if a man in Chicago makes a
12. Id. at 151. The Seely court did depart from some prior law. The NewJer-
sey Supreme Court had previously permitted a carpet purchaser to recover in strict
liability for the diminished value of carpeting that developed cosmetic defects.
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1965). Chief Justice
Traynor specifically declined to follow Santor, stating, "only if someone had been
injured because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for
imposing strict liability in tort." Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
13. M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 22.21 at 335 (2d ed. 1988).
[Vol.27:1
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contract with a man in New York, his rights and duties
cannot be determined without an elaborate investigation
into the conflict of laws. The only possible remedy that I
can see for this state of affairs is codification.
14
And so, fifty years later, came the U.C.C. The Code was largely
a response to the perceived need for a more homogeneous and
predictable body of rules for trade. 5
Exclusivity of U.C.C. remedies is critical to this uniformity. Af-
ter all, ready access to remedies outside the Code would introduce
a great deal of uncertainty in potential commercial litigation. The
U.C.C. would become nothing more than a fallback position, the
residual remedies to which parties and courts resort when no tort
theory quite fits. That was not what the framers had in mind. The
U.C.C. was envisioned as an authoritative body of law, from which
commercial traders could determine in advance the legal rules ap-
plicable to a particular transaction. The purpose of the Code is
better served by a system that minimizes the influence of external
rules. The economic loss doctrine protects this interest by exclud-
ing tort remedies from broad categories of commercial disputes.
B. Underpinnings Of Strict Liability
Strict liability is the paradigm example of the rise of tort in the
twentieth century. Product liability litigation was transformed by
the advent of strict liability and similar theories. Strict liability,
however, is specifically designed to fit the unique context of per-
sonal injuries in a consumer setting. Modern strict liability theory
flows in large part from the rule of absolute responsibility for un-
wholesome foodstuffs, which required special treatment because of
their propensity to cause serious bodily harm. 6 The early cases
14. M.D. Chalmers, Codification of Mercantile Law, 19 L.Q. REV. 10, 17 (1903)
(quoted in Speidel, supra note 6).
15. MINN. STAT. § 336.1-102 (West 1999). Professors White and Summers
have described the environment in which the U.C.C. developed: "Moreover, a ma-
jor objective of the 'uniform acts' [promulgated prior to the U.C.C.] had been to
promote uniformity. But not all states enacted the acts, and the courts of the
states rendered countless nonuniform judicial amendments.' By 1940 there was
growing interest in commercial law reform." JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (2nd ed. 1980).
16. Greenman v. Yuba Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal.
1963) ("Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability
has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or
greater hazards if defective.").
200]
5
Sylvester: Economic Loss: Commercial Contract Law Lives
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
emphasized the special obligations flowing from dangerous 'prod-
ucts, those that posed a risk to the health and safety of users.' The
economic loss doctrine recognizes and gives meaning to the impor-
tant distinction between personal injury and property damage. So-
cial interests in health and safety may outweigh the commercial in-
terests represented by the U.C.C., but where that social policy is not
implicated, commercial interests may once again carry the day."'
Strict liability is also founded on the relatively helpless position
of the consumer with respect to commercially marketed products.
Chief Justice Traynor's seminal opinions stressed that modern pur-
chasers have little opportunity to inspect a product for potential
hazards. 9 Strict liability results from the judgment that injuries re-
sulting from undiscovered faults are more appropriately the re-
sponsibility of sellers, who are in a better position than buyers to
prevent such faults. Courts adopting strict liability also relied upon
the substantial difference in bargaining power between sellers and
consumers.2 0 According to this analysis, even if an individual buyer
did identify a design change he or she thought would make the
product safer, the manufacturer would be unlikely to respond to
the suggestion. At the same time, mass consumers cannot realisti-
cally expect to negotiate terms of purchase with manufacturers,
and therefore cannot protect themselves by contractually shifting
the risk of loss.
C. Freedom To Contract
The typical economic justification for strict liability is alloca-
17. Id. ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injuty to a human being.") (emphasis added); Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (TraynorJ., con-
curring) ("Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.") (emphasis added).
18. The U.C.C. itself recognizes the same distinction between personal injury
and property damage. Sellers of goods may disclaim or limit certain warranties,
but no disclaimer may exclude liability for personal injuries resulting from prod-
uct defects. See, e.g, MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(3) (West 1999) ("Limitation of con-
sequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable"); Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Strutz, Note, Enforc-
ing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1111 (1983).
19. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900; Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concur-
ring).
20. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25,
32 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
[Vol.27:1
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tion of "external" costs to the party best able to bear and prevent
them. All liability schemes, of course, allocate losses among the
parties. The question in this context is whether the parties are en-
titled to determine allocation for themselves. Strict liability enforces
a loss allocation because the social interest in protecting consum-
ers' health and safety justifies intervention in the system. The eco-
nomic loss doctrine protects commercial parties' ability to deter-
mine their own allocation as a component of the terms of the deal.
The concept of "freedom to contract" rarely arises in modern
American legal opinions." However, it is a critical basis for not
only the economic loss doctrine, but for the organization of this
country's economy. The economic loss doctrine gives effect to the
parties' arrangements for allocating risk of loss. Tort claims inter-
fere with enforcement of the contract terms, and therefore ought
to be disfavored in commercial disputes.
III. EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC Loss IN MINNESOTA
The economic loss doctrine has a relatively brief history in
Minnesota. It was first recognized in full form at the start of the
1980's. A look at the development of the doctrine reveals two dis-
tinct phases coinciding with each of the decades in which the rule
has prevailed. However, at each step, the policy bases for the eco-
nomic loss doctrine are easily detected.
A. Initial Phase-The 1980's
1. Superwood-The Rule Announced
Although the economic loss doctrine emerged elsewhere in
the 1960's, Minnesota did not embrace it until 1981. In that year,
the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Superwood Corp. v. Siempel-
22kamp Corp. The plaintiff had purchased an industrial press from
the defendant manufacturer. After twenty-one years of service, the
press failed, causing no injury and no damage to the surrounding
equipment. The plaintiff brought both contract and tort claims in
federal district court. The court dismissed the contract claims on
21. "According to some commentators... freedom to contract, thought to be
so dominant in the latter part of the nineteenth century, is becoming increasingly
circumscribed by other social concerns and purposes." Pettit, supra note 3, at 265.
22. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), overruled by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
20001
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statute of limitations grounds." It certified to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court the question of whether the product liability claims
were viable.24
The supreme court rejected plaintiffs tort claims, permitting
only U.C.C. remedies. The opinion stressed the need to maintain
the integrity of the Code:
The U.C.C. clarifies the rights and remedies of parties to
commercial transactions.. .The recognition of tort actions
in the instant case would create a theory of redress not
envisioned by the legislature when it enacted the U.C.C.
Furthermore, tort theories of recovery would be totally
unrestrained by legislative liability limitations, warranty
disclaimers and notice provisions. To allow tort liability
in commercial transactions would totally emasculate
these provisions of the U.C.C. Clearly, the legislature did
not intend for tort law to circumvent the statutory
scheme of the U.C.C.
25
Superwood, therefore, acknowledged the distinct nature of
commercial transactions. The uniform and predictable nature of
Code rules and remedies is identified as being critical to facilitating
trade. Product liability theories, by implication, are relegated to a
different, extra-commercial context.
Importantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized all
elements of the U.C.C. as worthy of preservation. When the legisla-
ture adopted the Code, it did not merely enact the rules for inter-
preting sales contracts, it also enacted "liability limitations, warranty
disclaimers and notice provisions." Thus, the integrity of the
U.C.C. extends to the whole Code, including defenses and remedy
limitations.
Superwood announced the new rule: "economic losses that arise
out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal in-
jury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the
tort theories of negligence or strict products liability."2 6 This brief
formulation left ample room for further interpretation.
23. Id. at 160 n.1.
24. Id. at 160.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/1
ECONOMIC LOSS
2. Minneapolis Society Of Fine Arts-Component Products
Among the elements of the Superwood rule most open to inter-
pretation is the exception for "damage to other property." What
constitutes "other property" is not always entirely clear. In Minnea-
polis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker Klein Associates Architects, Inc., 27 the
state supreme court had an opportunity to lend guidance on that
subject. The plaintiff owned a building designed by the defen-
dants. Certain bricks integrated into the building failed. The
plaintiff brought both tort and contract claims, arguing that the
tort claims were valid because the building into which the bricks
were placed was "other property.
2 8
The court rejected this argument and the plaintiffs tort
claims. Noting that Superwood did not provide much insight into
the definition of "other property," the court considered the effect
of tort claims on the efficacy of the U.C.C.
[Plaintiff] has failed to prove physical damage to
property other than the brick itself. To hold that build-
ings constitute 'other property' would effectively overrule
Superwood as to every seller of basic building materials
such as concrete, brick or steel because the 'other prop-
erty' exception would always apply. The UCC provisions
as applicable to component suppliers would be totally
emasculated. 29
The presumption, in the case of commercial property damage,
is therefore that Code remedies are the only option. The "other
property" element of the doctrine is a limited exception. In nearly
all commercial settings, the Code should prevail.
3. S.J. Groves-Predominance Of Contract Claims
The next major Minnesota case, S.J Groves & Sons Co. v. Aero-
spatiale Helicopter Corp., ° was important both for its result and its
reasoning. The case arose from a helicopter crash in Bolivia involv-
ing a vehicle owned by a commercial entity. The pilot was killed,
27. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
28. Id. at 818-19.
29. Id. at 819-20. See also Trans. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
Inc., 30 F.3d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no damage to other property
where allegedly defective disk drive caused damage only to other components of a
computer system).
30. 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985).
2000]
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and his heirs subsequently settled their wrongful death action."
The crash destroyed the helicopter and also indisputably caused
damage to only a small amount of other property-(a radio and
two headsets in the helicopter) -when it went down. The owner
sued the manufacturer in both contract and tort, seeking to re-
cover all damages under all theories. The plaintiff claimed the ex-
istence of damage to some other property allowed it to "bootstrap"
tort claims for the entire amount.
The court rejected that effort. "[T]o allow a party to sue in
tort to recover substantial damages because of relatively minor
damages to 'other property' would thwart the policy implications of
Superwood.'' 3 Those policy implications included the unwarranted
expansion of the "other property" exception. If plaintiffs need only
identify some item of property other than the product itself, no
matter how insignificant, tort litigation would be utterly unre-
strained. Nearly every plaintiff could at least create a fact issue on
the existence of other property damage, holding the resolution of a
commercial dispute hostage to determination of tort liability. Con-
sequently, the critical issue to be determined is not whether some
independent piece of property suffered damage. It is whether the
injur on the whole is one properly treated as a commercial transac-
tion.
Just as noteworthy as this result was the court's explanation of
the policy foundations of the economic loss doctrine:
It is clear that this certified question comes to us in the
context of a commercial plaintiff with economic bargain-
ing power substantially equivalent to that of the seller. As
such, Groves had the opportunity to bargain both as to
the product's specifications and as to the risk of loss from
defects in it. This power to negotiate means that Groves
could have bargained for more extensive warranty pro-
tection and consequently any failure of coverage is at-
tributable not to 'gaps' in consumer remedies that tort
remedies should correct, but, rather, to the plaintiffs
31. Id. at 432.
32. Id. at 434 n.2.
33. Id. at 434.
34. In a similar vein, see McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc.,
410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1987) (noting economic loss doctrine as recognized
in Supenvood is based upon importance of not upsetting remedies of U.C.C., and
therefore does not apply to contracts primarily concerned with the provision of
services instead of goods, which are not governed by the Code).
[Vol.27:1
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The Groves court thus explicitly read into Minnesota jurispru-
dence the self-protection elements of the doctrine.
B. Second Phase-The 1990's
After recognizing and clarifying the terms of the doctrine in
the 1980's, the Minnesota Supreme Court turned to a more fun-
damental reexamination of the rule in the 1990's. After a decade
of experience with the doctrine, it was clear a new formulation was
required.
1. Hapka-More Limitation Than Exception
Neither Superwood nor its progeny adequately explained the
importance of preserving tort claims for damage to other property.
Whatever interest this exception served, by 1990 it had become
more trouble than it was worth. Litigation to determine whether
tort claims were valid was overwhelming the clarity and predictabil-
ity the Code was supposed to provide.
The court had its chance to rectify the situation in Hapka v.
Paquin Farms. There, a commercial farmer purchased seed pota-
toes from the defendant. Those potatoes turned out to be dis-
eased, and the infectious condition spread to potatoes purchased
from other sources. The other potatoes clearly qualified as other
property, and the farmer sought to bring tort claims on that basis.
The Hapka court noted that Superwoods reference to "other
property" was dicta, and rejected the distinction:
The steady stream of litigation attempting to qualify
for the exceptional treatment of damage to other prop-
erty has convinced us that the exception represents a re-
treat to the common law in derogation of the essence of
the Uniform Commercial Code: a complete and inde-
pendent statutory scheme enacted for the governance of
all commercial transactions. The Code itself indicates
that the U.C.C. is intended to displace tort liability.
[T]he law is entitled to expect the parties to com-
mercial transactions to be knowledgeable and of rela-
tively equal bargaining power so that warranties can be
35. Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 434.
36. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
2000]
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negotiated to the parties' mutual advantage. Having ne-
gotiated the warranties and any limitations of liability,
that a defective product causes damage to other property
should not defeat the liability parameters the parties have
set by opening the door to tort theories of recovery. ... If
the Code is to have any efficacy, parties engaged in com-
mercial activity must be able to depend with certainty on
the exclusivity of the remedies provided by the Code in
37the event of a breach of their negotiated agreement.
Hapka shifted the analytical emphasis from the nature of the
damage (a relatively fortuitous factor) to the nature of the transac-
tion. The more commercial the setting, the more exclusive the re-
liance on the U.C.C.
2. Den-Tal-Ez-The Merchant Orientation
Hapka addressed the economic loss doctrine broadly, without
stating specific limits on its reformulation of the rule. Uncomfort-
able with such a wide-ranging expansion of U.C.C. exclusivity, the
court turned again to the issue in 1992. Lloyd F. Smith Co., Inc. v.38
Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. dealt with another undisputed case of property
damage. The product involved was a motorized dental chair. It al-
legedly caused a fire that resulted in extensive damage to the den-
tal office, building, furnishings, records and office equipment. The
plaintiff sought to recover for the full extent of the property dam-
age, and challenged the Hapka limitations.
Den-Tal-Ez produced a comprehensive breakdown of economic
loss scenarios. The court held that the dentist was not an experi-
enced merchant of dental chairs. Although they were part of the
equipment regularly used in the office, the chair was not the sub-. 39
ject of any of the dentist's economic transactions. Since the plain-
tiff was not a merchant in this product, the sale of the chair was
more accurately treated as a consumer transaction rather than a
commercial transaction. As a result, tort claims were permitted:
[T]he U.C.C. provides the exclusive remedy for
other property damages arising out of a sale of goods
only when that sale fits Hapka's narrow definition of a
'commercial transaction,' i.e., where the parties to the sale
37. Id. at 688.
38. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
39. Id. at 16-17.
[Vol.27:1
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are dealers in the same goods or, to use a more precise
term, 'merchants in goods of the kind.' In actions for
damages to other property which arise from a sale of
goods between parties who are not 'merchants in goods
of the kind,' such as in the case here, the tort remedies of
negligence and strict liability are always available, even if
the parties can sue under the U.C.C. as well. And, of
course, an action for damage to the defective product it-
40self is always limited to a U.C.C. based recovery.
In discussing the issue, the Den-Tal-Ez court identified three
different categories of product liability plaintiffs, and three differ-
ent sets of policy priorities. The first category was those persons
who suffered personal injuries. Those persons are permitted to sue
in tort, even many years after the sale, when a warranty action
would be barred by the statute of limitations. When a plaintiff suf-
fers bodily harm, the court reasoned, "the law's concern for com-
pensating personal injury outweighs the commercial need for a
relatively short limitation period.
4
The second category consists of merchants in goods of the
kind which suffer only property damage. These plaintiffs-
"experienced merchants engaged in the buying and selling of their•,,42. • - .. 43
stock in trade l-are imited strictly to U.C.C. remedies. In these
cases, the primary policy issue ought to be meeting the commercial
need for reasonable control of the risk of a defective product. Ex-
clusive warranty remedies with short statutes of limitations best• 45
serve this need. This is described as the rule of Hapka.45
The final category is "consumer" purchasers that suffer prop-
erty damage. This category includes commercial entities that are
not merchants in goods of the kind, such as the dentist at issue in
Den-Tal-Ez 6 These plaintiffs are limited to U.C.C. remedies only
when seeking to recover for damage to the product itself. Other-
wise, because these were not truly commercial transactions involv-
ing parties with relatively equal capacity to protect themselves, tort
remedies are available.
40. Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id. at 16.
45. Id. at 17.
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3. Section 604.10-The Legislature Responds
With significant commercial interests involved, politicization of
the economic loss doctrine was virtually inevitable. Hapka pro-
duced a quick legislative reaction. Fearful of the effects of the deci-
sion on "quasi-commercial" entities (notably farmers), the legisla-
ture enacted a statute to codify the economic loss doctrine, and to
at least partially preserve the other property exception.
As originally enacted, the statute read:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods
that is due to damage to tangible property other than the
goods sold may be recovered in tort as well as in contract,
but economic loss that arises from a sale of goods be-
tween parties who are each merchants in goods of the
kind is not recoverable in tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods,
between merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible
property other than the goods sold may not be recovered
in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this
section does not include economic loss due to damage to
the goods themselves.48
Den-Tal-Ez provided an important clarification of the "merchant"
language used in this statute.
The legislature has twice returned to this statute. In 1993, it
added a new subsection:
(d)The economic loss recoverable in tort under this
section does not include economic loss incurred by a
manufacturer of goods arising from damage to the
manufactured goods and caused by a component of the
goods.49
This amendment codified the common law, ensuring that Minnea-
polis Society of Fine Arts remained good law. The second amend-
ment, in 1998, concerned contractual fraud claims, and is discussed
infra.
IV. INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The past century saw Minnesota courts establish the economic
48. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (West 1991).
49. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (West 1993).
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loss doctrine and develop its theoretical foundation. As one might
expect, twenty years is not long enough to answer all of the signifi-
cant questions about the new doctrine. Thus, important issues
have recently become apparent. In coming years we can expect to
see these issues decided. Hopefully, the answers will come from a
careful application of the policy interests underlying the doctrine.
A. Definition Of "Merchants In Goods Of The Kind"
Both the common law and statutory versions of the economic
loss doctrine in Minnesota now primarily protect merchants in
goods of the kind at issue. What is not entirely clear coming into
the new century, though, is precisely what determines whether a
party is a merchant in goods of the kind. Obviously, the phrase re-
fers to commercial entities and not "ordinary" consumers. Equally
obviously, following Den-Tal-Ez, not all commercial buyers are mer-
chants in every good they purchase.
The primary dispute in this arena is whether one must be a
"dealer" of the good-must engage in both the purchase and sale
of the specific product as part of one's regular business activities-
to be a merchant in the good. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue, but the local federal court has extended
economic loss protection to those who do not "deal" in the prod-
uct.
51In Board of Regents v. Chief Industries, Inc., the plaintiff was
the University of Minnesota. Nine years prior to suit, it bought a
grain drying unit for use in its agricultural research facility. When
the unit failed, it caused a fire that damaged the building and its
contents. The University claimed it fell into the third Den-Tal-Ez
category-non-merchants-because it did not sell grain dryers as
52part of its regular business. The court drew guidance from sec-
tion 2-104 of the U.C.C., which indicates that the term "merchant"
includes not only those who deal in a particular good, but also
those who have specialized knowledge of the good.53 Additional
50. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has made it clear that the doctrine does
not apply exclusively to merchants, however. Cf State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 572 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he economic
loss doctrine does not exempt consumer goods or non-merchant transactions";
however, non-merchants may bring tort claims for damage to other property).
51. 907 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v.
Chief Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir. 1997).
52. Chief Indus., 106 F.3d at 1411.
53. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-104 (West 2000)).
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support came from Den-Tal-Ez, in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasized not "dealership," but "the plaintiffs sophistica-
tion, knowledge, and bargaining power with respect to a particular
product., 54 Because the University had a great deal of specialized
knowledge of the product and its uses, and was a large and sophis-
ticated trading partner, it could be considered a merchant of grain
dryers and was barred from asserting tort claims.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has read
the term "merchant" much more restrictively. In Jennie-O Foods, Inc.
v. Safe-Glo Products Corp.,5 5 the plaintiff was a commercial turkey
farmer and processor. It brought suit against the manufacturer of
56barn heaters that allegedly caused two very damaging fires. The
court considered the defendants' objections to the tort claims un-
der section 604.10.5 1 Stressing that the U.C.C. defines only the
term "merchant," not "merchants in goods of the kind," the court
rejected Chief Industries as purportedly inconsistent with Den-Tal-58 ,
Ez. Therefore, the court held "that Jennie-O was not a merchant
in goods of the kind with respect to heaters and is not barred from
recovering in tort.,
59
In coming years, Minnesota courts would do well to follow
Chief Industries rather than Jennie-O, as it more correctly enforces
the principles supporting the economic loss doctrine. Under our
legal and economic system, parties generally ought to be held re-
sponsible for setting the terms of their own transactions. Only
when significant inequalities preclude one party from adequately
protecting itself should the courts provide extra-contractual reme-
dies. Inequalities can result from an imbalance of information
(and thus an inability to understand the risks against which one
must be protected), or from an imbalance of economic power (and
thus an inability to negotiate the terms one needs). Sophisticated
and knowledgeable commercial parties suffer from no such ine-
qualities and therefore need no additional protection, whether or
not they are dealers. A proper reading of Den-Tal-Ez supports this
conclusion. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
that while dealers are merchants in goods of the kind, that phrase
54. Id. at 1412.
55. 582 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
56. Id. at 577-78.
57. Id. at 578
58. Id.
59. Id. at 579.
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is a "more precise term" than "dealer.''6
From a doctrinal standpoint, there is no reason to limit eco-
nomic loss protection solely to dealers. Reselling a manufacturer's
product to the mass market does not inherently impart sophisti-
cated knowledge of a product, nor does it give one any greater lev-
erage over the manufacturer in negotiating warranty terms. In fact,
non-dealer merchants might actually be in a stronger position rela-
tive to a product manufacturer. When the manufacturer produces
highly demanded goods and permits only a limited number of
dealers to sell them, the manufacturer has a great deal of influence
over those dealers. The dealer must fear termination of its access
to a popular and profitable product line, and therefore cannot
make excessive demands of its supplier.
At the same time, making "dealership" the determining factor
would be unfair to plaintiffs. Not all dealers are likely to develop
sophisticated knowledge of a product's characteristics and risks.
Retail sellers, for instance, might carry thousands of product lines
and brands. A retailer's expertise with regard to each particular
product would be very limited, and so it might be unfair to apply
the doctrine in some retail contexts.
B. Fraud And Misrepresentation
Superwood had presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with
negligence and strict liability claims. In announcing the economic
loss doctrine, the court discussed the broad concept of "tort liability• ,,61
in commercial transactions. Negligence and strict liability are
not the only forms of tort liability likely to arise, though. When a
product does not live up to a buyer's expectations, the buyer can
increasingly be expected to assert claims for fraud as well.
Minnesota courts have provided little guidance on whether the
economic loss doctrine applies to such claims. One unpublished
court of appeals decision, ETM Graphics, Inc. v. City of St. Paul,
6 2
held that "the broad language in Hapka clearly prevents appellants
60. Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 17 ("[T]he U.C.C. provides the exclusive rem-
edy for other property damages arising out of a sale of goods only when that sale
fits Hapka's narrow definition of a "commercial transaction," i.e., where the parties
to the sale are dealers in the same goods or, to use a more precise term, merchants
in goods of the kind.").
61. Supenood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
62. No. C2-91-2103, 1992 WL 61394 (Minn. Ct. App., Mar. 31, 1992).
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from bringing a [fraud] action outside the purview of the U.C.C. 63
The federal district court for Minnesota originally determined that
Superwood did not preempt common law fraud and misrepresenta-
tion claims, 64 but subsequently found the reasoning of ETM Graph-
65ics persuasive.
An appropriate resolution of this issue would bring most, but
not all, fraud claims within the scope of the economic loss doctrine.
No doubt, there are instances of real and legitimately actionable
fraud in commercial transactions. However, fraud claims cannot
be allowed to become simply another variation on the breach of
contract theme. When the alleged fraud consists of failure to per-
form a promise embodied in the contract (i.e., the failure to pro-
vide a conforming product), the claim for fraud becomes nothing
more than a universal escape clause from U.C.C. remedies. Rather
than being a controlling source of stable and predictable rules for
trade, the Code would be valid only as long as the plaintiff desired
it to be.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with this issue in
1998 and recognized a critical distinction Minnesota should adopt.
66AKA Distributing Company v. Whirlpool Corp., held that the eco-
nomic loss doctrine can indeed apply to claims of fraud and mis-
representation. However, "the presence of a governing commercial
contract neither preempts nor eliminates the need for all fraud
claims to which the parties' dealings may give rise.' Instead, a
plaintiff is entitled to assert fraud that is "outside of or collateral to
the contract. ' 68 The AKA Distributing position strikes an appropri-
ate balance between the interests surrounding the economic loss
doctrine. It preserves the U.C.C. as the authoritative source of
rules governing the sale of goods itself. By reference to the Code,
buyers and sellers can determine with confidence the likely extent
of exposure for losses resulting from the failure of the goods them-
selves. However, the Code does not provide any protection against
63. Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted).
64. N. States Power Co. v. Int'l. Tel. and Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108, 111-12
(D. Minn. 1982).
65. In re Grain Land Coop, 978 F. Supp. 1267, 1279-80 (D. Minn. 1997); Up-
sher-Smith Lab., Inc. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1411, 1435 (D. Minn. 1996);
Nelson Distrib., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. Supp. 684, 687-88
(D. Minn. 1992).
66. 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998).
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extra-contractual fraud. Warranties may be perfectly adequate to
cover property damage when the product fails to perform as prom-
ised, but they do not suffice when the seller has made promises not
directly running to the quality of the goods. For instance, a prod-
uct manufacturer may engage the buyer with assurances that it is
well-capitalized and the picture of financial health. Warranty
claims seem a less appropriate option if those kinds of assurances
prove false to the buyer's detriment. A tort action for fraud in such
an instance would not threaten the U.C.C. because it would not re-
place an existing and limited Code-based remedy. It would instead
address an issue outside the purview of the Code and therefore a
proper subject 
for tort relief.or
Fraud claims have received recent legislative and judicial atten-
tion due to prominent litigation involving a Minnesota corpora-
tion. Marvin Windows, a major manufacturing company headquar-
tered in Warroad, Minnesota, has engaged in protracted litigation
with PPG Industries, Inc., a Pennsylvania-based manufacturer.
Marvin purchased a wood preservative treatment from PPG, and it
used this treatment on wood windows it manufactured and sold.
Marvin claimed the preservative treatment was defective because it
failed to prevent those windows from rotting prematurely, and that
it suffered economic harm when it repaired and replaced those
windows.'0 The district court initially applied the economic loss
doctrine to preclude Marvin's tort claims, which consisted of negli-
gence, strict liability, fraud and misrepresentation, except to the
extent it sought damages for property other than the windows
themselves." PPG then sought summary judgment on the warranty
claims on the grounds that they were barred by the statute of limi-
tations because Marvin stopped purchasing the preservative treat-
ment more than four years prior to bringing suit.
While the motion for summary judgment was pending, Marvin
approached the state legislature and sought an amendment to the
economic loss statute that it hoped would revive the dismissed tort
claims.7v The statute, passed during a special session in the spring
69. Suneel Arora, Note, Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Under
Minnesota's Economic Loss Doctrine After AKA Distributing Co. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
137 F3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998) and the 1998 Legislative Amendments For Marvin Win-
dows, 25 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 1501, 1537-41 (1999).
70. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741
(D. Minn. 1999).
71. Id.
72. Arora, supra note 69, at 1533.
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of 1998, added a new subsection (e) to section 604.10: "This section
shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of action based upon
fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or limit
remedies for those actions.,
3
The amendment also contained language characterizing itself
as a clarification of the law, rather than a substantive change, and
making the new provisions effective with regard to pending ac-
tions. All such language was an attempt to ensure that Marvin
could rely upon the amendment in its litigation against PPG.7 5
AKA Distributing and similar cases demonstrate the importance
of this issue, and should raise a cautionary flag against'legislating
an economic loss doctrine in response to perceived political crises.
In fact, sober reflection in the wake of the 1998 special session has
raised some serious concerns about the Marvin amendment. It ap-
76
pears the Minnesota legislature may revisit its hurried work, and it
would be wise to consider the AKA Distributing framework as it does
SO.
C. Statutory Claims
Minnesota, like most states, has enacted consumer protection
statutes that often play a role in product liability litigation. For in-
stance, an aggrieved purchaser might seek to recover not only for
strict liability and negligence, but also under the Consumer Fraud
71 78Act,77 the Unlawful Trade Practices Act, or the False Statements in
Advertising Act. 79 These tort-like statutory remedies are aimed at
consumers, but commercial buyers can qualify as consumers under
the right circumstances. As an example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has permitted a church, which purchased faulty roofing ma-
terials, to assert a claim against the manufacturer under the Con-
73. Act of Apr. 22, 1998, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2, 1998 Minn. Laws 2322 (codi-
fied as amended at Minn. Stat. § 604.10).
74. Id.
75. This attempt was unsuccessful. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 34 F. Supp. 2d at
743-44 (applying amendment only to actions under section 604.10 and not under
common law; since Marvin purchased the disputed product prior to enactment of
that statute, its action was governed by the common law economic loss doctrine).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed on this issue. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG In-
dus., Inc., __ F.3d -, No. 99-1424, 2000 WL 1182809, at *8 (8th Cir. Aug. 22,
2000).
76. Arora, supra note 69, at 1541 n.301.
77. MINN. STAT. § 325F.68-.70 (West 2000).
78. MINN. STAT. § 325D.09-.16 (West 2000).
79. MINN. STAT. § 325F.67 (West 2000).
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sumer Fraud Act. 0
As Church of the Nativity demonstrated, such statutory tort
claims can implicate the economic loss doctrine every bit as much
as a strict liability claim. The church's claims were permissible, be-
cause it was not a merchant within the meaning of the U.C.C. and
therefore its purchase was treated as an ordinary consumer transac-
tion.8 ' These statutory claims pose much the same issue as the
question of who should count as a merchant in goods of the kind at
82issue in a products case. - Decisions in this area, therefore, should
continue to focus on the extent of the plaintiffs knowledge of the
product and sophistication as a commercial entity. No experienced
and savvy business should be permitted to invoke consumer protec-
tion statutes any more than it should enjoy the right to seek recov-
ery under a negligence or strict liability theory. If the plaintiff
qualifies as a merchant in goods of the kind, it must be held solely
to U.C.C. remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
The last twenty years have seen rapid development of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine in Minnesota. After Superwood, the Uniform
Commercial Code has been a much more secure refuge for busi-
ness transactions in this state. As the twenty-first century com-
mences, more questions remain. The answers, however, may be
derived from principles firmly established during the 1980's and
1990's.
80. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 7
(Minn. 1992).
81. Id. at8.
82. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., - F.3d , No. 99-1424, 2000 WL 1182809, at
*9 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000).
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